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 1. Introduction 
 
In political economy and public finance, the linkage between decentralization and the quality 
in the provision of public sector services has been much debated. However, empirical 
evidence is limited because, in general, the quality of public sector services is hard to 
measure, and decentralization mainly varies across countries. In this paper we utilize a 
country panel based on several comparative international achievement tests of students to 
quantify the quality of compulsory education, and estimate the effect of public sector 
spending decentralization within a panel data framework. 
 
 
2. Related literature 
 
Oates (1972) argues that, in general, more decentralized decision-making allows better 
adjustment of (local) supply to locally heterogeneous demand. In the model of Hoxby (1999), 
public school productivity is higher with decentralized financing through local property taxes 
since Tiebout mechanisms reveal important information on local demands. In Seabright’s 
(1996) framework with incomplete contracts, the main advantage of decentralization is that it 
is easier to hold decision-makers accountable. For some other arguments, including possible 
negative effects of decentralization, see for example Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer (2008).   
 
In the economics of education literature, the empirical evidence mainly supports the view that 
decentralized governance structure in the education system improves on student achievement. 
For example, Wößmann (2003) finds in a cross-country analysis that school autonomy exerts 
a beneficial impact. Similarly, Hoxby and Rockoff (2004) report that autonomous charter 
schools perform better in the US than public sector schools. For the UK, Clark (2005) 
identifies a positive effect of a major reform granting larger school autonomy. For Argentina, 
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2002) show that the decision to decentralize public education in 
the early 1990s raised student achievement, while for Norway Naper (2008) reports that 
decentralized hiring of teachers increases school effectiveness. On the other hand, Merrouche 
(2007) finds that decentralization of education spending responsibility in Spain did not affect 
the illiteracy rate and the probability of non-compulsory education. Regarding general 
  2decentralization, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) identify for Switzerland a positive effect on 
the share of high school graduates in the 19-year old population. The literature is inconclusive 
on whether the employed measures of school spending decentralization approximate the 
general decentralization in governance structure, or whether educational decentralization is 
important per se.  
 
 
3. The Model and Data 
 
Our empirical model focuses on the relationship between school quality and public sector 
decentralization. We define school quality in terms of achievement in test scores obtained 
from all six comparative international achievement tests conducted by students aged 13-15 
years during the relevant period 1980-2000.
1 We use the national average of the scores in 
Mathematics and Natural Science tests, and standardize them in order to ensure comparability 
across tests.
2 For a detailed description of the standardization procedure, see Falch & Fischer 
(2008).  
 
Decentralization is commonly defined as the percentage of sub-national government spending 
in general government spending, calculated by the World Bank up to 1999. In order to keep 
PISA 2000 in the analysis, we use its one-period lag. Keman (2000) and Treisman (2000) 
argue that it is important to distinguish discretion in terms of financial policy implementations 
by local administrations (‘the right to act’), which we measure directly, from local 
government political autonomy (‘the right to decide’), which we capture only indirectly.   
 
In addition, the empirical model includes as co-variates GDP in current 2000 $, population 
size, education in the adult population measured as the share with at least some secondary 
education, and the size of the public sector that insures against income shocks (see Falch and 
                                                 
1 We use the results of the SIMS and SISS tests conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (IEA) in 1980-81 and 1983-85, respectively, the IAEP test in 1990-91, IEA’s TIMSS 
tests in 1994-95 and 1998-99, and the OECD PISA test in 2000. 
2 Our procedure is based on the fifteen most frequently participating countries. For each test, the results are 
standardized for these “core” fifteen countries such that the unit of the dependent variable is a standard deviation 
in the test result among the “core” countries. For a given year and test, the average value of the dependent 
variable for all countries then depends on the test performance in the participating “non-core” countries.  
  3Fischer, 2008, for justification). We use two measures of public sector size: (a) Government 
social expenditures, obtained from OECD, which comprises expenditures on pensions, active 
labor market policies, subsidies for housing and families, and public health care, and (b) 
government consumption spending that measures public goods creation but excludes financial 
transfers to households. As for population size, GDP, and government consumption spending, 
the variables are obtained from the WDI (WDI, 2007). Country fixed effects account for time-
invariant features such as institutions and culture (e.g., the national school system, school 
autonomy, population preferences, etc.). In addition, they mitigate potential endogeneity 








For reasons of comparability, we restrict the sample to well-established OECD countries with 
relatively stable political and administrative systems, excluding the post-communist countries. 
Thus, only OECD members as of 1990 are included. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. 
The standard deviation of the dependent variable is close to unity. On average, local 
government spending constitutes 31 percent of total government spending, varying from four 
percent (Greece) to almost 60 percent (Canada). For all variables, the within-variation seems 
to be sufficiently strong to justify a fixed effects specification. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The way the dependent variable is constructed is an argument for not including time fixed effects in the model. 
With time fixed effects, the within country variation will depend not only on the performance relative to the 
“core” countries, but also on which other countries that have participated in the specific tests. On the other hand, 
there is some time-series variation in the independent variables (see also Falch and Fischer, 2008). With the 
dummy variable for 2000 included in the model, a test for joint significance of the remaining time specific 
effects has a p-value of 0.36 (F(7, 47) = 1.14)). Time specific effects are therefore not included in the models 
reported. The effect of decentralization changes only marginally if the dummy for 2000 is excluded (for column 
2, coeff. of 0.084, significant at 5 percent level). 
  44. Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 provides the regression outcomes. In column (1) we present the simple correlation 
between spending decentralization and test scores. The relationship is weakly positive and 
only significant at 10 percent level. The rest of the table presents results based on panel 
country fixed effects specifications. Column (2) excludes public sector size measures, while 
columns (3) and (4) include them. 
 
Comparing the results in column (1) with (2) shows that omitting country fixed effects and 
covariates biases the effect of decentralization downwards. The effects of decentralization are 
3-4 times larger in columns (2)-(4), and all significant at 5 percent level. This result implies 
that an increase in spending decentralization by 10 percentage points increases student test 
scores by 0.8 standard deviations. This is a non-trivial effect given that three countries in the 
sample have a within-variance in decentralization of above 5 percentage points.  
 
Columns (3) and (4) show that the positive effect of decentralization is robust to the inclusion 
of public sector size, measured by either total government consumption or social spending. 
The effect of governance structure does not appear to be mediated through government 
spending activities. Both public sector size coefficients are negative and of similar magnitude 
as reported in Falch and Fischer (2008), but of lower statistical significance, probably due to 
fewer observations in the present analysis. Indeed, only social spending exerts an attainment 
lowering impact significant at 10 percent level. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 




The results also imply that student performance is not affected by GDP, population size, or 
educational attainment in the adult population. Regarding GDP, there may be an endogeneity 
problem in the long-run because of a growth enhancing effect of student achievement 
(Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). However, excluding GDP from the model does not alter the 
effect of decentralization (column 2: coeff. of 0.071, significant at 5 percent level).  
  5 
Given that decentralization increases student achievement while government size tends to 
reduce it, one would expect, in line with the finding for life satisfaction in Bjørnskov et al. 
(2008), that decentralization is more advantageous in the case of large governments than with  
small governments. Columns (5) and (6) add interaction terms between our measures of 
government size and decentralization. Both interaction terms are negative, contradicting our 
hypothesis, which indicate that the detrimental effect of a growing government sector is 
aggravated by more policy implementation at the local level. However, only the interaction 
with social spending is significant at 10 percent level, and the coefficient sizes are relatively 
small. This suggests that the contribution of decentralization to the total effect is only 
marginal; the greatest distortion of markets appears to be triggered by public sector size itself. 
 
From the viewpoint of fiscal decentralization, its beneficial effect is reduced by expanding 
local government’s involvement in the economy. In explanation, in decentralized countries, 
(labor) market distortion effects through non-internalization of inter-jurisdictional spillovers 
may increase as government’s involvement in the economy rises. Nevertheless, the overall 
effect of decentralization remains positive: at face value, the results imply that the total effect 




Potential transmission channels 
The last part of Table 2 investigates two potential transmission channels for the effect of 
spending decentralization. Column (7) tests the hypothesis that decentralization impacts test 
scores through an effect on expenditures levels for compulsory education (e.g. Fischer, 2005). 
We employ primary schooling expenditures per pupil, measured as percent of GDP.
5 The 
effect is clearly insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient of decentralization stays significant, 
unambiguously indicating that its positive effect is not transmitted through educational 
spending.  
                                                 
4 The estimated coefficients can readily be interpreted because all interacted variables are centered. For centered 
log of social spending the within-variation ranges from -0.248 to 0.198. 
5 Obtained from the World Bank education database. In this database, there is much less observations for 
secondary education than for primary education. 
  6 
In principle, fiscal spending decentralization may only approximate decentralization of 
government spending on education, a finding that would be in congruence with the school 
autonomy effects found by Wößmann (2003). In this case, no beneficial effects of all-
government decentralization should be present. We investigate this issue by including 
decentralization of educational spending in column (8). This variable is constructed 
analogously to general spending decentralization, equally taken from the OECD education 
database,
6 and is based on public expenditures on compulsory primary and lower secondary 
education. Since education decentralization is only available from 1997 on, we lag the general 
fiscal decentralization variable with three years in order to include the 2003 tests in the 
analysis. The effect of education spending decentralization is clearly insignificant, which 
indicates that it is general decentralization that is important for school performance. Column 
(9) shows that our findings for general government decentralization and social spending hold 
even with the altered lag structure. Taken all together, these findings rather suggest that 
decentralization in education system observed in the previous literature may approximate 





A panel data analysis of international student test scores suggests that overall public sector 
spending decentralization is beneficial to student performance. This general decentralization 
effect appears not to be mediated by levels of, or decentralization in, educational spending. 
Our tentative analysis suggests that the advantageous effect seems to be largest in countries 
with a small public sector, and diminishes when government size increases. However, further 
research is necessary on the transmission mechanisms through which the positive effect of 





                                                 
6 Public direct expenditures for educational institutions, excluding private expenditures. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 




Student achievement  -0.31  0.98  .44  -2.86  2.10 
Decentralization, lagged  31.31 14.38  1.63 3.84  58.73 
Population size (log)  16.73  1.54  .048  12.50  19.46 
GDP per capita (log)  10.04  0.26  0.15  8.72  10.83 
Adult education attainment (log)  3.64  0.32  0.11  2.65  4.20 
Social spending as % of GDP (log)  2.95  0.28  0.09  1.76  3.48 
Government consumption spending as % of GDP (log)  2.94  0.20  0.06  2.41  3.39 
Primary educational spending per pupil (log)  2.86  0.30  0.16  2.14  3.74 
Education decentralization
7
  65.98 38.92  0.98  0.00  99.99 
Note. Unbalanced panel data with 83 observations from 24 OECD countries. For education decentralization, 




                                                 
7 The countries with entirely centralized educational spending are New Zealand (1998, 2000, 2002, 2003) and 
Turkey in 2003. Their exclusion from the regression sample does not alter our main findings in Table 2, column 
(8). 
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Table 2: Decentralization and student performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Decentralization, lagged  0.021+  0.071* 0.082* 0.085* 0.061 0.076*  0.099+ -0.010  0.054* 
  [0.012] [0.033] [0.034] [0.033] [0.037] [0.033] [0.049] [0.059] [0.025] 
Population  size  (log)  -  -0.974 -0.429 1.957 -1.489 2.868 0.816 -3.826 0.517 
    [2.448] [2.450] [2.681] [2.551] [2.680] [4.757] [5.269] [2.104] 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  -  0.154 -0.288 -0.217 0.041 -0.435 0.507 0.563  -0.13 
    [0.858] [0.901] [0.846] [0.925] [0.839] [1.299] [2.031] [0.713] 
Secondary education in adult   -  -0.078  0.487  0.783  0.157  0.957  -0.19  1.643  0.285 
population  (log)    [0.671] [0.767] [0.758] [0.798] [0.750] [1.205] [2.511] [0.582] 
Year  2000  -  0.461** 0.464** 0.427** 0.453** 0.418** 0.366+ 0.549** 0.451** 
    [0.158] [0.156] [0.154] [0.155] [0.151] [0.195] [0.127] [0.125] 
-  -  -1.682 - -1.189 -  -  -  -  Government consumption  
spending (% GDP) (log)      [1.143]  [1.189]        
Gov. cons. * decentralization  -  -  - -  -0.082  - -  -  - 
        [0.060]        
Social spending (% GDP) (log)  -  -  - -1.331+ - -1.213+  -1.373  -1.749  -0.908+ 
      [0.665]  [0.655]  [0.888]  [1.044]  [0.530] 
social spend.* decentralization  -  -  - - -  -0.067+  - -  - 
         [0.038]      
primary education spending  -  -  - - - -  -0.339  -  - 
per pupil (% of GDP) (log)           [0.448]     
decentralization in education  -  -  - - - - -  0.041  - 
           [0.043]   
Country  fixed  effects  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations  83 83 83 82 82 83 66 54  107 
R-squared  0.0902 0.8556 0.8613 0.8694 0.8661 0.8768 0.8751 0.9585 0.8541 
Number  of  id    24 24 24 24 24 23 23 24 
R2  within    0.2873 0.3153 0.3509 0.3391 0.3878 0.3685 0.5218 0.2810 
Notes:  +, *, ** denote significances at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
Interacted variables have been centered on the regression sample mean. In columns (8) and (9) fiscal decentralization and adult 
education are lagged by three periods.  
 